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The usefulness of private arrangements and legal rules for the mainte-
nance and promotion of social and economic relationships depends, in
great part, on their effective enforcement. Enforcement, however, is not
possible unless violations are first detected. It therefore seems critical to
consider the ability and motivation of legal actors to monitor each other's
behavior.1
The level of monitoring in a simple two-party transaction is likely to
be efficient. The monitor will continue to expend effort as long as his cost
of doing so is less than his expected benefit. But when there are many
potential monitors with overlapping interests, the optimal level may prove
more elusive. An individual seeking to reduce his own monitoring costs
may attempt to rely on the efforts of others; such "freeriding," 2 if wide-
spread, will lead to undermonitoring. Overlapping interests can also lead
to duplicative efforts on the part of potential monitors. From an economic
perspective, both undermonitoring and overmonitoring are undesirable.'
This Article considers the possibility that legal relationships and rules
relieve monitoring difficulties, including the freeriding problem, and
thereby promote joint enterprises. In particular, it examines the role that
monitoring plays in commercial and corporate settings. Part I considers
the role of security interests in determining creditor priorities in bank-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I am much indebted to Michael Dooley,
Roberta Romano, and Robert Scott for their patient counsel and helpful suggestions, and to Anthony
Kronman for stimulating my interest in some of the topics discussed in this Article.
1. The law and economics literature has recently begun to examine the role of monitoring in legal
contexts. Most of the interest in this area can be traced to Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Other
relevant works include: Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure,
25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 738 (1978); Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1091-94 (1981); Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relation-
ship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979); Smith & Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capi-
tal Structure: Comment, 34 J. FIN. 247 (1979).
2. Although the term "freerider" generally refers to someone who relies on the efforts of others
and not to someone who expends duplicative efforts, it is used throughout this Article to include both.
The freeriding problem is thus taken to be the problem of inefficiency.
3. Both raise the cost of economic interaction. Comparing the level of effort of a group of monitors
against the monitoring level of a single hypothetical monitor is similar to the familiar technique of
analyzing pollution levels or other externalities against the behavior that would be generated by "in-
ternalizing" that externality. See W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 518 (1972).
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ruptcy. It demonstrates that the freeriding problem is solved if unique
monitoring tasks can be assigned to secured creditors. The discussion sug-
gests that the observed monitoring role of secured and unsecured creditors
is consistent with a debtor's attempt to minimize its interest costs. Part II
describes how a corporation's financial structure is responsive to monitor-
ing and freeriding considerations. It argues that secured creditors, bond-
holders' trustees, and, to a lesser extent, preferred shareholders provide
common shareholders with useful information about managerial misbe-
havior. Thus, the presence of these actors can reduce the corporation's cost
of raising capital. Both the discussion of secured credit and of the
corporate financial structure indicate that economic arrangements can be
shaped by monitoring and freeriding considerations.4
In Part III, the Article adopts a normative perspective and suggests that
legal rules should give proper weight to the role played by monitors. As
examples of how the law should be cognizant of monitoring issues, this
Part discusses the sale of corporate control and the role of creditor stand-
ing and provides a framework for the analysis of rules in these and other
areas.
I. The Role of Secured and Unsecured Creditors
Because private legal relationships are normally the product of bilateral
bargains, efficient monitoring arrangements are important to both the
monitoring and monitored parties.' In the language of agency, a principal
will benefit from ease in uncovering instances of actual or potential misbe-
havior by his agent; an agent who is difficult to monitor will have compar-
ative difficulty securing employment by principals. The relationship be-
tween a secured creditor and debtor is one such principal-agent
arrangement.
4. For example, firms might find that some credit structures allow expansion at a lower cost, or,
perhaps, firms that happened to adopt more efficient mixes of debt and equity, from a monitoring cost
perspective, might survive their competitors. Such an "evolutionary theory" of private arrangements is
much less vulnerable than an evolutionary theory of legal rules.
5. Because all contractual relationships follow explicit or implicit bargains, the "bilateral" nature
of this large class of legal relationships is superficially obvious. But the discussion in this Article
considers many long-term contractual relationships in which parties have reason to be concerned
about one another's behavior. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note I, at 1090-91 (contracting
parties face intricacies and uncertainties that require specially adapted contractual devices). Many
noncontractual relationships also generate mutual monitoring concerns because the parties might con-
sider altering the terms of their interaction by entering into a contract. See Calabresi & Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1118 (1972) (using entitlement to pollute as example of noncontractual rule that can be
changed by bargain).
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A. The Need to Monitor the Debtor
From the creditor's perspective, fears of debtor misbehavior, that is, that
the debtor will break promises made to the creditor, can be allayed by a
sufficiently high interest rate. The debtor's first creditor, C1, will, for ex-
ample, be made worse off if the debtor arranges an additional loan with
another creditor, C2. The increased debt intrudes upon the equity cushion
previously enjoyed exclusively by Cl.' In addition, Cl's claim is devalued
to the extent that C2's claim is accorded priority, either with respect to a
specific asset or over Cl's entire claim. 7 Before agreeing to the loan, how-
ever, Cl can require an interest rate sufficiently high to feel compensated
for the potential interposition of creditors in the receiving line.' Ulti-
mately, a creditor may be indifferent between being paid a high interest
rate by a debtor with a high expected debt-equity ratio and being paid a
low interest rate by a debtor with a low debt-equity ratio.
It is instead the debtor's perspective that is important to an understand-
ing of the structure of business loans, because it is the debtor that benefits
from reduced interest expenses. Inasmuch as creditors fear broken
promises that in effect lower the interest rate ex post,9 it is in the debtor's
interest to lessen these fears by offering a package of promises that credi-
tors can easily monitor and therefore trust.10
There are many factors that potentially affect a creditor's risk and re-
turn and many promises that a debtor might make to its creditors. Conse-
quently, there are many categories of potential debtor misbehavior. This
discussion focuses on the two most important types of misbehavior: con-
6. The value to a secured creditor of an equity cushion is a function of bargaining and informa-
tion costs. If, for example, the creditor were aware of the debtor's insolvency as soon as it occurred
and were able to extract interest payments in advance or on a daily basis, there would be no need for
any cushion; at the moment of insolvency the creditor would take back property equal in value to his
loan. More realistically, the creditor is better off with a larger equity cushion beneath his claim.
7. If the value of C2's collateral decreases and no longer covers the amount of the loan, then C2
will share in the equity cushion enjoyed by Cl.
8. A creditor may be satisfied with a portfolio of loans that effectively diversifies debtor misbehav-
ior and fortunes. For a discussion of risk diversification, see W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 151-55 (1980).
9. Had the creditor known that more debt would be assumed, it would have required a higher
interest rate ex ante.
10. The contractual relationship is, of course, mutually advantageous. But, for expository reasons,
the discussion regards the debtor as the initiator of the credit arrangement because the debtor bears
the costs of the agency relationship and therefore gains from reducing them. See Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 1, at 313-19. Agency costs can be reduced by "bonding" and "monitoring." See id. at 308.
Bonding activities are those which the agent undertakes to demonstrate its trustworthiness or make the
principal's policing task easier. Thus, the agent might employ a reputable auditor to provide informa-
tion to its principal. Monitoring activities are efforts by the principal to limit agent misbehavior.
Because so many activities involve a mixture of efforts and because pure bonding expenditures are
rare, the discussion in this Article does not adopt the suggested distinction and instead combines the
efforts of both the principal and the agent in the term "monitoring."
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version and risk alteration.1' Conversion occurs when an individual or
group that is involved in the management of a firm takes company assets
and uses the proceeds for its own benefit.12 Risk alteration takes place
when a debtor switches to a riskier business strategy after loans from its
creditors have been made final. In doing so, it gambles with creditors'
funds; when the business does poorly, all investors lose, but when it suc-
ceeds, the debtor pays only fixed charges to creditors and keeps the re-
maining "upside return." Creditors may, therefore, require a promise that
the debtor will not switch to a riskier line of business. They may even
retain the right to call in a loan on demand so that they can terminate the
financing relationship when risk rises to the point at which the negotiated
interest rate is unattractive.
Neither of the major forms of managerial misbehavior is necessarily
apparent to the passive creditor. For example, a creditor whose monitor-
ing is limited to clipping coupons and noticing nonpayments may be una-
ble to detect the embezzler whose misappropriations chip away at the
creditor's cushion and increase the risk of future shortfalls. Similarly, the
passive creditor cannot be expected to know when the debtor firm's mana-
gerial decisions increase the volatility of its business fortunes and the
probability of default. Yet these possibilities are of concern to every credi-
tor and therefore require active monitoring of the debtor.
B. Relative Monitoring Talent: The Jackson-Kronman Model
The explanatory power of monitoring theory-excluding freeriding
considerations for the present-was recognized by Professors Jackson and
Kronman in the context of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.23
They tried to explain why, despite significant administrative costs, secured
transactions are so popular. The existence of secured financing might
seem counterintuitive at first because any advantage enjoyed by a secured
creditor able to satisfy a claim with a particular asset in an exclusive
way14 is offset by the corresponding disadvantage of unsecured creditors
who are then further removed from assured repayment. Any savings in
interest costs to a debtor that grants a security interest to one creditor
11. In fact, virtually all conceivable types of debtor misbehavior contain elements of conversion or
risk alteration. C1 might fear, for example, that the debtor prefers C2 to the detriment of 0l, even if
the debtor itself does not benefit directly through conversion. This fear, however, concerns risk altera-
tion because, ex ante, Cl is as likely to be preferred as disfavored. Similarly, a creditor might fear that
interest payments will be missed because of careless or purposeful debtor behavior, but such a fear
ultimately involves implicit conversion or risk alteration (with respect to the timing of the payments).
12. Conversion affects not only creditors but also outside shareholders.
13. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1.
14. The power of a security interest derives mostly from the priorities it is granted. See U.C.C. §§
9-312 to -316 (1977).
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would appear to be exactly offset by the increased interest requirements of
other less-favored creditors.15
Jackson and Kronman sought to explain secured transactions by focus-
ing on the relative monitoring costs of concerned creditors and suggesting
that some creditors-in particular, trade suppliers-may be able to moni-
tor the debtor more cheaply than other creditors.16 A financing system
that differentiates between secured and unsecured creditors allows moni-
toring tasks to be assigned efficiently; relatively "untalented" monitors are
able to shy away from monitoring and become secured creditors while
their more "talented" counterparts bid for employment as monitors
through the unsecured interest rate. The total interest costs of the debtor
will then be less than they would be with just one class of creditors. The
Article 9 system can thus be viewed as establishing the set of rules that all
three parties (debtor, talented creditor, passive creditor) would reach in
the absence of transaction costs.17
Unfortunately, the Jackson-Kronman explanation of security interests
is not satisfactory. As Professor Alan Schwartz has recently argued, many,
if not most, actual unsecured creditors appear to be relatively inferior
monitors. 8 It is likely, for example, that a large debtor's banker is better
able to police the debtor's post-loan risk-taking than are its employees or
occasional suppliers.19 Yet, such banks are frequently secured creditors.
The literature on monitoring cost theory simply does not explain typically
observed credit arrangements.
C. The Impact of Freeriding
The shortcomings of current monitoring cost theory derive in part from
its lack of attention to the problem of freeriding. Consider again the need
for C1 to be wary of debtor misbehavior. Why should C1 expend re-
sources attempting to discover such misbehavior? C2 is also affected by
15. For a numerical example, see Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Re-
view of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8-9 (1981).
16. This relative efficiency may be a function of talent, location, experience, specialization, or
attitude. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1,-at 1155 n.47, 1156 n.50.
Inasmuch as the discussion in the text continues to regard relative monitoring costs as an important
explanatory variable, it is important to note that it is the comparative advantage of a monitor that
earns the adjective "efficient." Thus, C1 may be a more talented monitor than C2, but Cl may earn
still greater returns in some other occupation. Because of his alternative opportunities, Cl would
charge more than C2 to perform given monitoring tasks. In such a situation C2 is then to be regarded
as the more efficient monitor.
17. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1157. For a general description of this role of contract
rules, see Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 588 n.87
(1977).
18. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 11 n.28.
19. Banks have better access to data and may often be consulted by many future lenders inquiring
into the debtor's past. See infra p. 56.
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such misbehavior and C1 may well expect C2 to monitor the debtor. Simi-
larly, C2 may anticipate that C1 will perform the necessary monitoring.
This situation, like others in which one activity benefits numerous parties,
poses a freeriding problem.20 The two creditors may engage in duplicative
monitoring efforts or they may rely on each other's efforts and fail alto-
gether to monitor the debtor. Although it is possible that one creditor will
be a brave bluffer and the other a conservative pessimist and that the
debtor will then be monitored in an ideal manner,21 such a result can
hardly be expected. Moreover, a suboptimal result is more likely the more
numerous the creditors.22
1. Joint Monitoring Ventures
Creditors might solve their freeriding problem by undertaking a joint
venture that would employ a predetermined, efficient monitor to investi-
gate the debtor's activities.23 Such ventures do, of course, already exist in
the form of credit agencies that accumulate past histories of debtors, with
creditors normally paying a fee to acquire the collected information. That
such associations are not popular for monitoring debtors' future activities
may be a function of the substantial costs entailed in their establishment
and the additional cost of monitoring the monitor. The latter cost reflects
a thorny problem considered later in this Article;24 for the present, it is
convenient to assume that the monitor has a stronger interest in its repu-
tation than do the debtors that it monitors.
For such a monitoring association to solve the freeriding problem and
save the debtor some interest costs, the coventuring creditors must believe
that the debtor will not bring in new creditors that do not join the existing
20. The freeriding problem is a central feature of the analysis of two familiar legal issues: vertical
restrictions in antitrust law and comparative and contributory negligence rules in tort law. In the
former, discount retailers may freeride on the sales efforts of competitors. See R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 290-91, 430-31 (1978). But see Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An Essay
on Vertical Restrictions and Consumer Information, 67 IOWA L. REV. 981, 986-92 (1982) (freeriding
problem may be solved by nonretailers, such as consumer-supported publications). In tort law, the
freeriding problem is most acute in "alternative care" cases, in which an injury could be prevented by
any one of two or more parties. Each one hopes another will expend the effort necessary to avoid
damage. Thus, it may be impossible to structure liability rules with optimal behavioral effects. See
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-7, 19-20 (1980).
21. See supra note 3.
22. Consider an example with many creditors, any one of whom could perform the optimal level
of monitoring. In deciding whether to perform such monitoring, each creditor would attempt to pre-
dict the behavior of other creditors. The more creditors there are in the calculus, the less likely it is
that one, and only one, will decide to monitor. Either no creditor would monitor, or too many would
do so. I am indebted to Alan Schwartz for drawing my attention to this issue.
23. Agreeing on contribution levels for such a venture is, among other problems, a formidable
transactional difficulty. The creditors might contribute equally or proportionately to their investments,
but they also might try to tailor fees to the constraints on the debtor that they have individually
required.
24. See infra pp. 61-64; note 158.
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association. If not, new creditors would be able to freeride on the joint
venture's efforts, or the association might be tempted to freeride on the
monitoring efforts of new creditors. The "extra promise" required of a
debtor-that it not deal with creditors that do not support the joint moni-
toring effort-may itself pose a most difficult monitoring task. It could
well be that, unless the law requires all credit arrangements to be publicly
recorded or penalizes (subordinates) creditors who do not join in this solu-
tion to the freeriding problem,25 it will be extremely difficult to know
when a debtor has indeed brought in a new creditor but has not required
this new creditor to support the group monitoring arrangement.2"
Nor is the creditors' freeriding problem solved by limiting the number
of creditors with a common monitoring interest. In the extreme case, if
each debtor can be limited to dealing with one creditor, there will be no
freeriding danger at all. But the single creditor would face the same prob-
lem that unravels joint monitoring ventures: the debtor must be unable to
bring in new creditors. Moreover, the costs of such a system to a faithful
debtor would be forbidding. Employees, suppliers, customers, and virtu-
ally all business contacts are frequent creditors, and the task of ensuring
that debtors always prepay them would be a formidable one. Finally, the
uncertainties surrounding the initial negotiations between creditor and
debtor would lead to very high transaction costs, thereby increasing the
very interest rate that the debtor seeks to minimize. Debtors cannot, there-
fore, regularly solve the freeriding problem among creditors by engaging
in joint monitoring ventures or by agreeing to deal with a limited number
of creditors. In the absence of any satisfactory solution, debtors will need
to compensate creditors with higher interest payments for their redundant
monitoring efforts or unallayed fears regarding debtor misbehavior.
2. The Role of Security Interests
Debtors might, however, solve the freeriding problem by offering secur-
ity interests to certain creditors. Consider, for example, a simple debtor
with assets consisting of some petty cash, accounts receivable, a company
car, and common office supplies. Although there is an imaginable threat of
risk alteration, the most serious potential misbehavior would seem to be
the sale of the car followed by a conversion of the proceeds for the debtor's
personal use. Creditors may be unaware of such misbehavior because each
25. Such legal regulation, however, does not wholly solve the freeriding problem, because it would
still be necessary for creditors to monitor compliance with the recording provisions.
26. Although it is the debtor that will ultimately enjoy the lower capital costs that accompany
reduced monitoring costs, see supra note 10, these only affect its posture ex ante; ex post, the debtor
might still seek to borrow at lower cost by colluding with a new creditor at the expense of the pre-
existing ones (to the extent the credit and monitoring arrangements make this misbehavior possible).
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might hope that the other will monitor the ownership of the debtor's vehi-
cle." In this setting, the benefits of secured financing are clear. The free-
riding problem is largely avoided if one creditor can be assigned to moni-
tor the debtor's car, as a secured creditor, with little expectation of effort
on the part of other creditors. To be sure, if an available creditor is a
relatively talented monitor, the security interest (and the attached moni-
toring task) can be assigned so that the freeriding problem is solved and
the monitoring talent put to good use.2" Accordingly, the Jackson-
Kronman model, which depicted the talented monitors as assuming posi-
tions as unsecured creditors, seems flawed in its failure to recognize the
freeriding problem among creditors.
A monitoring theory that includes freeriding considerations is consistent
with the casual evidence commented upon by Professor Schwartz29 and
meets the major objection to the Jackson-Kronman model. A typical com-
mercial bank, for example, appears to have excellent monitoring ability. It
is experienced, enjoys economies of scale, is financially sophisticated, and
has ready access to many of the assets and records of the debtor and its
business associates.30 That banks are frequently, if not exclusively, se-
cured creditors thus fits the suggested monitoring theory.
Freeriding considerations also explain the Code's somewhat puzzling
and different treatments of two other contributors to the firm's financial
structure: the financer of a new asset and the "financing buyer," who
advances funds for the production of desired goods. The Code offers a
"purchase money security interest"-and therefore a relative priority
(with a grace period for filing)-to the former,"1 but no similar arrange-
27. Again, it may be equally inefficient (and costly to the parties involved) for both creditors CI
and C2 to monitor the vehicle and, therefore, "overmonitor."
28. The secured creditor is rewarded for monitoring by a priority interest and by diminished risk
(so long as the value of his collateral is not dissipated).
29. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 11 n.28 (explaining monitoring role played by commercial
banks). Professor Schwartz is also troubled by the Jackson-Kronman implication concerning short-
term credit, see Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1159 (long-term loan provides more opportu-
nity for misbehavior and is more likely to be secured). Presumably, short-term creditors are less likely
to perceive subtle forms of misbehavior, such as risk alteration, than are long-term creditors, yet short-
term creditors are commonly secured. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 13. But in the model described in
this Article, the debtor will offer assets as collateral when these assets are appropriate focal points for
debtor misbehavior. It matters little whether these assets are assigned to short-term or long-term
monitors.
30. The bank's comparative size seems particularly helpful in dealing with state recording systems
and for generating consequent monitoring advantages.
31. See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312(3), 9-312(4) (1977) (allowing lender, whose advances enable the
debtor to acquire specific collateral, to gain priority over previously perfected interests so long as such
lender files within ten days of debtor's acquisition of collateral). Jackson and Kronman explain this
priority as creating competition for the lender with an "after-acquired property clause." Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 1, at 1166-78. This view, however, overlooks the debtor's ability to repay such a
lender and begin anew with another creditor.
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ment to the latter.3 2 This treatment may reflect an expectation that the
financer of new equipment will be a more talented monitor than the
financing buyer and therefore better suited to a unique assignment as a
secured creditor. 3 If this financer is a commercial bank, its suitability is
clear; and if the financer is the vendor or manufacturer of the new asset, it
will often also be a talented monitor because of its familiarity with the use
and maintenance of the asset in question.
3 4
3. The Incentive to Monitor
Given their monitoring roles, it is fair to wonder why secured creditors
are not further encouraged to use their talents (and freedom from the
freeriding problem) to monitor the debtor. The "secured monitor" could,
for example, be given a priority to the extent of the particular security
interest but then actually be subordinated to the unsecured creditors for
any part of its claim not ultimately satisfied in bankruptcy by the assigned
collateral. In the prevailing Article 9 system, the secured creditor's incen-
tive to monitor derives solely from the premium it has paid in the form of
agreeing to lend at a lower interest rate, and it consists of the right to
satisfy its claim with the agreed-upon collateral. Still, if the secured credi-
tor could satisfy its claim only with the assigned collateral or were subor-
dinated to the unsecured creditors for any amount not satisfied by the
collateralized asset, it seems likely that the secured creditor might have an
additional incentive to monitor.
A creditor priority system that sought to increase monitoring incentives
in this way would, however, face two obstacles. First, consider that among
the risks assumed by the secured creditor is the possibility that the collat-
eral will depreciate despite the creditor's monitoring efforts." If the se-
cured creditor in bankruptcy has recourse only to the collateralized asset,
then the secured creditor will be unlikely to agree to an interest rate lower
than that agreed to by unsecured creditors unless the collateral's value
32. See Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1 (1975) (describing
and decrying Codes failure to treat financing buyer and seller similarly).
33. The Code's rule may therefore represent the bargain most parties would reach in the absence
of transaction costs. See supra p. 53.
34. Among other factors, the vendor or manufacturer is likely to recognize certain subtle forms of
risk alteration more readily than other monitors. For example, the debtor firm's manager may be
cutting corners on the maintenance of equipment in order to boost current earnings. Only a monitor
knowledgeable about such equipment might detect such misbehavior.
In contrast, the financing buyer is much less likely to be especially talented in monitoring the
debtor's assets. It can thus be argued that the Code does not favor new money over old money. But see
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 32, at 2-3 (sympathizing with financing buyers because they inject
new money into debtor's enterprise). Rather, the Code assigns unique monitoring tasks to talented
monitors.
35. For example, an automobile might decrease in value as a result of an unexpected increase in
the cost of fuel, or it might depreciate faster than previously predicted.
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were considerably greater than the loan extended to the debtor. But if this
were the case and the asset did not depreciate significantly, the secured
creditor would have a sizeable cushion against both depreciation and
debtor misbehavior, and its incentive to monitor would consequently be
reduced. Unsecured creditors are then unable to rely on the single monitor
and are left to deal with their freeriding problem.
A separate difficulty with a system intended to stimulate monitoring
efforts by denying the secured monitor a fallback position as an equal of
the unsecured creditors arises because the assets that are available for se-
curity interests are not always perfect "focal" (observation) points of
debtor misbehavior. Although the efficiency of the monitoring arrange-
ment depends on the link between the concerns of the secured creditor and
those of all creditors, this link is an imperfect one. Not all potential debtor
misbehavior fits the secured monitor scheme as neatly as does the com-
pany car hypothetical."' What if, instead, another form of misbehavior
affects the value of all the debtor's assets and is more easily detected by an
unsecured creditor, such as an employee?37 It is hardly sensible to dis-
courage this (unsecured) monitor from expending some policing effort by
constructing a system that places a cushion of inadequately secured credi-
tors behind the unsecured ones. Moreover, suppose the secured monitor is
in the best position to discover the debtor's misbehavior but refrains from
doing so because its collateral is entirely dissipated, although other assets
can still be salvaged. Again, it seems unwise to establish a priority system
that sometimes reduces the secured creditor's incentive to monitor.
3 8
D. A Mixed Monitoring System
The preceding analysis presents a simple model in which a legal ar-
rangement, secured financing, neatly responds to the freeriding problem
among monitors when there are good "focal points" to be assigned. When
such focal points are unavailable, talented monitors are best employed as
unsecured creditors so that they will, at least, have some incentive to mon-
itor. Other creditors who are less talented or prefer security in an environ-
ment thick with freeriding potential will tend to acquire collateral.3 9 The
36. See supra p. 56.
37. Employees are able monitors in some settings because of their obvious locational advantages.
That employees' wage and pension claims are rarely secured may reflect the fact that the monitoring
best undertaken by employees is of low cost and generates little freeriding potential. Giving one class
of workers security interests would, of course, reintroduce the freeriding problem.
38. Occasionally, neither of these fears is well-founded and the secured monitor is best motivated
by narrowing or eliminating its fallback position in the event that the collateral proves insufficient to
satisfy its claim. The secured creditor might then take its monitoring task most seriously. A nonre-
course loan, in which the lender agrees not to look beyond the collateralized assets to satisfy its claims,
is one such example.
39. See supra pp. 52-53.
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Jackson-Kronman model can thus be seen as explaining a subset of the
entire secured financing system.
In sum, Article 9 fosters a mixed monitoring system.4 When particular
assets are useful focal points of debtor misbehavior, efficient monitors
serve as secured creditors and are rewarded with priorities for solving the
freeriding problem among creditors.41 Fortunately, many serious forms of
debtor misbehavior are well-linked to physical assets that can be assigned
to these talented monitors. The debtor can hardly switch location or lines
of business or otherwise engage in risk alteration without substituting or
removing assets and drawing the attention of the conscientious secured
monitor. Even convertible liquid assets often will be well-monitored in
this framework because they are frequently the proceeds of the disposition
of physical assets, including inventory, that were suitable subjects for se-
cured transactions.42 But in other situations, available assets are simply
poor focal points for monitoring the debtor's activities. In such settings,
talented monitors will prefer to serve as unsecured creditors, collecting
their rewards in the form of interest rate premiums that exceed their ac-
tual monitoring costs.4"
II. The Corporate Structure
As a set of complex contractual relationships, the corporate firm gener-
ates a variety of monitoring and freeriding problems."" In developing the
details of these influences on the corporate structure and the role of debt
in alleviating the freeriding problem among investors, the discussion first
considers the inadequacy of familiar responses to the freeriding problem
among owners of the firm and then examines the ways in which the firm's
40. The Article 9 secured financing system as analyzed in this Article can be seen as an "ena-
bling" legal institution: it codifies the private arrangements many parties would reach in the absence
of transaction costs. It is neither a legal rule nor the product of judicial decisions.
41. The value of the collateral must, of course, approximate the advances of the secured creditor.
If the collateral is of much greater value, then there is little incentive to monitor (unless default
provisions are particularly desirable or interest rates have risen so that the creditor would prefer to
retrieve its funds). If the collateral is of lesser value than the loan, then the creditor is really partly
unsecured; the creditor's fate, and therefore its monitoring role, differs from that of other unsecured
creditors only to the extent of the collateral's value.
42. See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1977) (facilitating continuation of security interest with respect to after-
acquired property including accounts receivable and new inventory); id. § 9-306 (facilitating security
interest in "proceeds" received from sale or exchange of original collateral).
43. However poor the focal points, the debtor will still be monitored to the extent that its misbe-
havior is easily noticed by creditors. The longer the duration of the debtor's misbehavior, the more
likely that some creditor will stumble across it. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1159.
Alternatively, the debtor's misbehavior might be noticed because of agreed-upon loan conditions or
debtor-supplied information.
44. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 1, at 776-91 (describing monitoring and freeriding problems in
corporate ownership structures); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1, 41 (1980) (analyzing insider trading in monitoring cost framework).
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financial structure responds to monitoring and freeriding considerations.
A. Freeriding Among Shareholders: Unsatisfactory Solutions
If one assumes that some agents, including corporate managers, gain
more utility from shirking45 and self-dealing" than from maximizing the
benefits that flow to their employers, then the need for shareholders to
monitor their investment is apparent. These shareholders, however, face a
freeriding problem.47 Especially in a typical large corporation, managers
are unlikely to own more than a small interest in their firm; their incen-
tive to misbehave is thus likely to be great."8 At the same time, because
large enterprises require pooling of capital, they tend to have numerous
shareholders and, therefore, a substantial freeriding problem. Moreover,
the complex nature of the activities undertaken by large enterprises is
such that it is counterproductive to simplify the monitoring task by limit-
ing managerial discretion with inflexible instructions. 9
1. Managers' Reputations
To the extent that the corporation's performance generates information
about its manager, shareholders might be satisfied with an ex post review,
meanwhile relying on the manager's "reputational interest" in promotions
and lateral employment opportunities. Certainly, a meritocratic structure
that rewards productive managers encourages good behavior. More funda-
mentally, however, the proposed solution merely restates the monitoring
problem. An employer needs to distinguish among good and bad perform-
ances in order to reward the truly good ones. 50 But employers are numer-
45. Shirking is defined as neglecting one's duty in a manner unlikely to be corrected by one's
principal. The employee who leaves work earlier than the time agreed upon is a shirker.
46. Acts of self-dealing are affirmative misdeeds. The range of self-dealing is reflected in the body
of corporate law dealing with fiduciary breaches. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON CORPORATIONS 518-882 (5th ed. 1980).
47. This problem is well-recognized in the literature. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 778-80.
Freeriding among shareholders can lead either to insufficient or excessive monitoring. See supra p. 49.
48. The incentive to misbehave is caused by a divergence of interests between principal and agent;
thus, a manager's incentive to misbehave increases as his own interest in the firm decreases.
49. In large part, the history of such attempts is the history of the declining role of ultra vires. See
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 46, at 38-45. Nor would the monitoring problems of large
firms disappear in a structure containing numerous small enterprises (rather than fewer large firms).
Monitoring problems do not depend on entity size per se but rather on the extent of interaction with
other firms and on the complexity of production and distribution processes. Smaller firms may simply
have more suppliers, with freeriding and monitoring problems identical to those facing the larger
firm's investors.
50. The employer who seeks to hire from another firm's ranks faces special difficulties. In particu-
lar, the available information is so often tied to corporate secrets that it is impossible to learn about a
manager's actual performance. The role of references is quite important, though ambiguous, in this
setting. Such references may be used to unload an undesirable employee on another firm or, by sup-
pressing glowing impressions, to retain productive employees.
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ous and dispersed and their attempts to investigate and reward (or to hire
a representative to undertake this task) are stymied by the freeriding
problem. Despite small ownership interests of their own, some managers
might maximize their firms' values to demonstrate their worth to potential
or current employers. Others, however, will realize that reputational in-
terests may not be worth building and that hard work does not always
produce recognizable gains. A complex organization with multiple sources
of revenues- and expenses and no identically situated competitor does not
easily lend itself to "before-and-after" comparisons."M Moreover, past per-
formances, however accurately assessed, will not always be accepted as
reliable indicators of future behavior. The selfish manager may only begin
misbehaving when the stakes are large, the compensation level and retire-
ment account already substantial, and the costs associated with the moni-
toring of his performance especially high because of the firm's complexity
and the job instructions' flexibility. In short, gains from misbehaving can
easily exceed the expected meritocratic rewards, so that the pressures of
the labor market may offer inadequate checks on managerial misbehavior.
2. Outside Directors
The presence of outside, or independent, directors on the boards of
large corporations is generally recognized as a response to the ineffective-
ness and inadequacy of direct shareholder participation in the governance
of the firm.52 The most obvious freeriding is eliminated by the corpora-
tion's absorption of the cost of nominating, electing, and maintaining these
professional monitors.5" It is perhaps not surprising that some commenta-
tors place great faith in this institution as a solution to the freeriding-
monitoring problem."
A recurring weakness with such an approach, however, is the need to
monitor monitors. The financial rewards available to outside directors are
hardly better linked to the shareholders' interests than are the managers'
compensation packages.55 As with all enforcement questions, it may seem
51. To be sure, some employers (such as sports teams or stock brokerage companies) appear to
promote and demote management on the basis of the absolute rather than the relative performance of
their firms. This practice may simply reflect the inability of such firms to make critical comparisons
and, therefore, their willingness to experiment.
52. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 780.
53. See id.; Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31
BUS. LAW. 1799, 1835-36 (1976).
54. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 170-85
(1976); Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1811.
55. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 780 n.123 (reporting practice of compensating outside directors
with flat annual fees); see also Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 613 (1982) (noting that monetary incentives cannot accurately and
adequately compensate economically motivated directors for their efforts, and that significant compen-
sation could counterproductively discourage effective monitoring).
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that the threat of legal liability, with punitive or criminal components suf-
ficient to offset the expectation of non-detection, is sufficient to deter mis-
behavior. Without sufficient monitoring, however, such deterrents are un-
likely to be successful. Moreover, given the vagueness of the "business
judgment rule,"56 the boundaries of misbehavior of both manager and
monitor cannot be drawn infallibly.5"
It is possible, however, that while a manager's gain from misbehavior is
likely to exceed his expected reputational loss, a professional monitor's
reputational loss from "mismonitoring" will normally outweigh his direct
personal gain. Indeed, many outside directors of major corporations are
well-known personalities with considerable potential reputational losses to
bear.5"
Unfortunately, the professional monitors who serve as outside directors
are ill-equipped for their task; there are few resources and few disinter-
ested aides at their disposal. 59 The funding of outside directors is usually
determined by the same managers whose potential misbehavior the direc-
tors are engaged to uncover. Moreover, perhaps as a result of the inade-
quate tools placed at their disposal or the process by which they are nomi-
nated, 0 casual evidence suggests that outside directors become friendly
peers of their codirectors rather than inquisitive and pressing monitors.61
To be sure, the institution of the outside director might contribute to a
more successful solution of the freeriding problem if the law required cor-
porate contributions of some magnitude to a "monitoring fund" that
would finance directors' inquiries. Unfortunately, proponents of reforms
that call for the strengthening of the outside director's position see the
professional monitor as representing "society" as a whole, including con-
56. See Brudney, supra note 55, at 607-09, 614 n.50, 615-16.
57. Not only will a badly drawn or inspected boundary discourage some desirable decisionmaking,
but also it will surely deter potentially useful monitors from accepting positions on corporate boards.
If the corporation offers to pay insurance premiums and secure liability insurance that protects direc-
tors against lawsuits, the monitoring function of the liability rules is, of course, diminished. See
Bishop, New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against Liability Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1160, 1164; Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078,
1094-95 (1968).
Of course, insurers could monitor the firm, solving the freeriding problem in passing, but there is
no evidence that they perform any active monitoring role or that policyholders (firms themselves) wish
to pay for this service. Presumably these insurers, like independent directors, are themselves difficult
to monitor or are grossly inefficient at monitoring.
58. See J. BACON & J. BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION AND
LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD 30-35 (1975).
59. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 54, at 144; Brudney, supra note 55, at 609; Solomon, Restruc-
turing the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581, 585
(1978).
60. See Brudney, supra note 55, at 610 & n.39.
61. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 54, at 147; Solomon, supra note 59, at 584-88.
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sumers, employees, unemployed workers, and users of the environment. 62
The conflicts among these claimants"-not to mention the larger question
of the propriety of resolving these tensions at the expense of bystanding
shareholders whose equity is at stake-draw attention away from the un-
derlying problems of shareholder preferences, representation, and action
that, although less controversial, lie at the center of any modern capitalist
system. At any rate, the institution of independent directorships is at best
an incomplete solution to the freeriding problem among shareholders.
3. The Capital Market
In one sense the existence of an active market for a firm's stock exacer-
bates the monitoring problem. A shareholder or experienced monitor
whose investigative efforts yield information about managerial misdeeds"
will almost surely prosper more from immediately selling (or selling
short) shares before the market price reflects the firm's trouble than from
calling attention to the discovered misbehavior."5 An active capital market
may therefore encourage private monitoring but discourage the whistle-
blowing that normally makes monitoring efforts generally useful.
Nevertheless, the capital market often is thought to solve the monitoring
problem in a large-scale manner by simplifying the acquisition or take-
62. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 124-28
(1976) (arguing for more diverse, public oriented corporate boards); Dahl, A Prelude to Corporate
Reform, I BUS. & SOC'Y REV. 17, 19-20 (1972) (suggesting interest-group representation on corporate
boards). For a less radical view that still considers the interests of most disenfranchised groups, see C.
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 134-83 (1975).
63. See Chirelstein, Corporate Law Reform, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PRE-
DICAMENT 41 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
64. In this context, misdeeds refer to discrete, affirmative acts that go beyond mere shirking. See
supra notes 45-46 (distinguishing between self-dealing and shirking).
65. The investigator has three profitable options regarding discovered misbehavior: selling, buying
and improving, and whistle-blowing. The last is only profitable if the managers correct their behavior
or are displaced. The whistle-blower then profits according to his ownership interest in the firm. The
discussion in the text argues that the first option, selling with the expectation that the market will
eventually learn about the firm's weaknesses, is likely to be the most attractive to an investigator and
that the second option, a takeover bid, may be profitable to the acquirer but may, at the same time,
increase monitoring problems.
The incentive to monitor and then act in a selfish way is not diminished by the possibility of
discovering good news (exceptionally good managerial behavior) about the firm. The monitor will
realize that the ill-informed market expects average behavior from the firm's managers and that the
discovered information regarding good behavior indicates that eventually the market will realize the
firm's superior performance given the resources at its disposal. As such, the selfish monitor will buy
shares of the firm's stock (and, if practical, announce the good news to the public). This trading will,
of course, push the market price in the "correct" direction (and may thereby eventually signal good
managerial behavior) and serve the equally useful social purpose of rewarding monitors. Because the
level of such monitoring might decrease if stock trading on the basis of this sort of unequal informa-
tion were ruled illegal, such trading ought not to be prosecuted. See generally Levmore, Securities and
Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 145-48 (1982) (discussing
signalling effects of stock prices and rewards for economically efficient actors).
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over of a poorly managed firm by an outside acquirer.6" The professional
monitor will be motivated by the potential rewards when, as an acquirer,
he profits as the firm's true potential is realized under his superior con-
trol. 17 But this model of the takeover process as a check on misbehaving
managers is unconvincing if the basic assumptions regarding monitoring
costs and the temptations of managerial misbehavior are taken seriously.
Typically, one publicly held firm acquires another. The acquirer is
then itself an organization with shareholders who must be on the lookout
for misbehavior. Following the acquisition, the manager in control of the
conglomerate firm will probably have more incentive and increased poten-
tial to misbehave. When the two firms are combined under the control of
the acquirer's manager, the costs of monitoring this manager will un-
doubtedly rise. The number of shareholders (and therefore the freeriding
potential) will almost certainly have increased, and the manager's owner-
ship interest will have dropped, making it more rewarding for him to cash
in his reputational interest. Finally, in conglomerate enterprises it is likely
to be even more important to delegate broad discretionary authority.,
Clearly, the capital market is as likely to exacerbate monitoring problems
as to solve them.
4. The Derivative Suit
The danger that monitors will sell short rather than initiate generally
useful corrective action is aggravated by the fact that such action fre-
quently entails costly litigation. To the extent that litigation costs are
awarded to the enterprising plaintiff or attorney who guides a derivative
suit, the freeriding problem can be alleviated; all shareholders benefit
from the successful suit and, through the corporate intermediary, all share
in the cost of litigation.6 9 Because costs are not always awarded,70 how-
ever, an informed monitor may be discouraged from litigation (or from
monitoring at the start). Moreover, even if successful plaintiffs were virtu-
ally guaranteed generous awards, sufficiently risk-averse monitors may
nonetheless hesitate to sue because such awards may still be insufficient to
66. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1981).
67. Id. at 1173.
68. Unfortunately, in their enthusiasm for capital markets and takeovers, recent commentators
have neglected these monitoring problems in the post-acquisition firm. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 66, at 1169-74. Certainly, if the acquirer were a single individual or a firm with no need
to monitor subordinates, as assumed by Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 349, then an acquisition
would eliminate misbehavior and monitoring costs. But these assumptions rarely hold in reality.
69. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 46, at 938-40.
70. Not all monitoring efforts yield tangible or measurable benefits to the monitored corporations.
See id. at 939-42. Furthermore, a security-for-expenses requirement further discourages monitoring
by derivative actions. Id. at 949-51.
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compensate them for their a priori desirable, if ultimately fruitless, moni-
toring efforts.
7 1
Presumably, monitors could be encouraged to investigate and litigate by
a system that builds on the foundation of derivative suits and offers
greater rewards to prospectors. Victorious plaintiffs might be given more
generous fees, or, as in antitrust law, where similar freeriding problems
exist,7 2 misbehaving defendants might be required to pay some multiple of
actual damages. Although such radically different enforcement systems73
are beyond the reach of this Article, it is worthwhile to note that such
schemes generate other dangers. Generous incentive systems may en-
courage overly enterprising plaintiffs, who, despite groundless claims, will
willingly gamble on their abilities to elicit friendly verdicts from errant
juries or, what is essentially equivalent, profitable settlements from tired
and risk-averse defendants.
74
B. The Responsiveness of the Firm's Financial Structure
The discussion now turns from examining the monitoring and freerid-
ing problems of the corporate enterprise to understanding the responsive-
ness of the financial structure of corporations to these monitoring and
freeriding difficulties. As in the description of security interests,75 the
analysis at first excludes freeriding considerations and, in reviewing the
work of Professors Jensen and Meckling, regards the debt-equity mix of a
firm as responsive to relative monitoring costs. The analysis then relaxes
that assumption and examines the ways in which this mix can be under-
stood as responding to the freeriding problem among shareholders.
One important disclaimer is appropriate at the outset: the analysis at-
tempts to contribute to-and not to dominate-an understanding of the
financial structure, including the debt-equity ratio, of the firm. The na-
71. Successful plaintiffs may be well-compensated for their monitoring efforts that lead to the
critical lawsuit. Many monitoring efforts, however, will not uncover violations and will, therefore, not
be compensated. Even if a potential monitor expects to be fully compensated for efforts that lead to
successful litigation but expects no compensation for efforts that do not uncover misbehavior, he may
refrain from monitoring or from the required level of monitoring. This points to a common choice in
the design of incentive systems: to encourage explorers or enforcers, society must either pay their costs
all of the time or pay more than their costs when they are successful. Because true costs are difficult to
measure, the first option may encourage undesirable "fishing" expeditions. On the other hand, a
reward system that compensates monitors on balance for both productive and unproductive efforts is
difficult to design correctly.
72. See generally K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 3-7, 68, 112-38 (1976) (discussing treble damages and efficient fines as methods of com-
batting freeriding problem in antitrust).
73. See Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1975); Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
74. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 434-41 (2d ed. 1977).
75. See supra pp. 52-59.
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ture and explanation of financial structures is an enormous puzzle that
has been commented upon extensively in the literature. 6 In solving this
puzzle, it is important to take into account tax considerations, 7 bank-
ruptcy fears and costs,7 8 and the value of corporate control.7 9 The contin-
ued efforts to assess the relative importance of these elements indicates
that their combined explanatory power is not completely satisfactory.80
The analysis in this Article attempts, then, to contribute to this inquiry.
1. The Jensen-Meckling Contribution
The terminology and central features of the Jensen-Meckling model81
can be summarized as follows:
1) A manager does not behave as would a sole proprietor because some
of the fruits of the manager's efforts accrue to "outside" owners of the
firm. The smaller the manager's ownership share of the firm, the greater
is the incentive to misbehave. This misbehavior may be blatant (self-deal-
ing) or subtle (shirking).
2) Shareholders will realize that some (costly) amount of monitoring is
optimal,82 that some managerial misbehavior is inevitable, and therefore,
that both of these "agency costs" must be taken into account in evaluating
a given investment opportunity.
76. See, e.g., E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE (1972); W. KLEIN, supra note
8, at 220-52; Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital, 22 J. FIN. 395 (1967); Jensen
& Meckling, supra note 1; Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261 (1977); Modigliani & Miller, The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
77. The deductibility of interest costs to the corporation is one small piece in this puzzle. If tax
considerations are relevant, it is because some individuals' tax rates are sufficiently greater than the
corporate tax rate so that it is desirable for these individuals to hold debt and for the corporations to
retain earnings. See W. KLEIN, supra note 8, at 248-52. On the other hand, to the extent that the
market prices of investment vehicles reflect their relative attractiveness to investors, tax considerations
might all be reflected in before-tax returns so that a firm does not care about taxes in choosing a debt-
equity mix. See Miller, supra note 76, at 269-71.
78. A high degree of leverage increases the risk of bankruptcy and, therefore, the cost of capital.
See Baxter, supra note 76, at 402 (concluding that firm's financial structure results from balancing tax
advantages of debt against risk of bankruptcy costs associated with debt); Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 1, at 333 (finding that bankruptcy costs discourage high debt-equity ratios).
79. For example, a controlling manager will be disinclined to issue more equity if new outside
shareholders might threaten his controlling position.
80. Of course, it may be that there is no satisfactory explanation of firms' debt-equity ratios. The
mixes may be irrelevant and random or they may simply appeal to investors' tastes that are, in turn,
either the product of individual tax or portfolio considerations or even aesthetic choice. This Article
adopts no view regarding the influence of any of the variables mentioned in the text on the firm's
capital structure. It merely offers an explanation of the role of secured credit and associated institu-
tions in the context of such structure. This role will be more important in some models than in others.
81. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1.
82. Again, "bonding," or manager-initiated steps to reduce the costs of an agency relationship, is
also possible; but the discussion continues to regard monitoring as an all-inclusive term. See supra
note 11. Were these costs and benefits quantifiable with precision, the shareholders would monitor to
the point at which the marginal cost of monitoring would equal the marginal benefit associated with
reduced managerial misbehavior. Such a straightforward relationship, however, fails to take the prob-
lem of freeriding into account.
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3) There are also substantial agency costs associated with outside debt,
because fixed claims create an incentive for the manager-shareholder to
engage in risk alteration.83 He may elect to forego socially desirable
projects with relatively high expected returns when such projects are un-
likely to offer substantial returns to equity, as opposed to returns to both
debt and equity.84 Creditors can try to prevent such behavior by imposing
inflexible guidelines and covenants, but if they do so the firm might pass
up good investment opportunities.8" Debt will be incurred to the extent
that monitoring costs are smaller than both the returns available from the
projects that require additional capital and the agency costs of additional
outside equity.
Under the Jensen-Meckling model, the greater the stake of managers in
the enterprise, the less their incentive to misbehave (and the need to moni-
tor). Their desire to diversify and eliminate unsystematic risk, however,
keeps most managers from investing their entire wealth in their employ-
ers' business.86 The cost of raising outside equity thus reflects the moni-
toring concerns of outside shareholders. Debt becomes an attractive alter-
native to equity when the monitoring anxieties of creditors, which derive
mainly from the manager-shareholder's position on the "equity team,"
can be allayed at a lower cost than the concerns of outside equity inves-
tors. 7 Jensen and Meckling conclude that, after the manager's own will-
ingness to invest is exhausted and the effects of tax and bankruptcy con-
siderations are included, the firm's debt-equity ratio will be determined by
the interaction of the monitoring cost functions of outside shareholders
and outside creditors.88 Their model thus describes the financial structure
of the firm as dependent upon the monitoring environment that it creates.
83. The manager's ownership interest does not diverge from that of other stockholders in this
regard. Rather, it is creditors who charge more for their capital as their fears of risk alteration grow.
These outside creditors might gain confidence as they observe the fixed quality of some "inside debt,"
such as managers' compensation claims. It is plausible that managers could mimic the outside debt-
equity ratio in their own portfolios and thereby reduce the costs of outside debt (by reducing monitor-
ing concerns). See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 352-54. This possibility does not interfere
with the role of secured credit. See supra pp. 56-59.
84. For example, assume that project A offers a safe return of $45 and that creditors are owed
$40, so that equity owners will be left with $5. Project B, if it succeeds, offers a return of $60, so that
$20 would be left for equity, but is as likely to fail and offer $10, so that equity and debt "share" the
loss. The manager may well choose project B although the expected return to both debt and equity
from B is $35 and, therefore, less than that offered by A. The expected return to equity alone under
project B is $10, $5 higher than that under project A. Thus, a socially less desirable project may be
selected. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 334-38.
85. Where creditor covenants seek to restrict the risk taken by the corporation, managers might be
compelled to refuse investment opportunities with relatively high expected returns but with "unac-
ceptable" levels of risk.
86. See W. KLEIN, supra note 8, at 153-55.
87. Creditors fear both conversion and risk alteration. See supra p. 52. Outside shareholders fear
conversion and generally benefit from risk alteration.
88. See Jensen. & Meckling, supra note 1, at 344.
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Although this analysis is a great deal more illuminating than one that
marches through firms' balance sheets ignoring monitoring considera-
tions,"9 it remains somewhat unsatisfactory even before the introduction of
freeriding difficulties. Consider an enterprise with the following financial
structure: $100,000 of "inside" equity, $99,900,000 of outside equity, and
no debt. The manager has a 0.1 percent ownership share and, therefore,
his potential returns from misbehavior are dangerously high. Is this prob-
lem really relieved significantly if, instead, the debt-equity ratio were 1 or
2, that is, 50 or 67 million dollars of debt with correspondingly less equity
in the structure? It is difficult to imagine that the temptation to misbehave
or the difficulty of monitoring drops measurably simply because the man-
ager's share of the residual claims rises to 0.2 or 0.3 percent.90 Thus,
although the different monitoring costs associated with debt and equity
are likely to influence the firm's financing choices, the explanatory power
of the model seems limited.
2. Creditors as Useful Monitors
The effects of monitoring on the debt-equity ratio of a firm are better
understood if freeriding considerations are included in the analysis. Lend-
ers must contend not only with managers who threaten to convert assets
and to alter risk but also with the duplicative and suboptimal monitoring
efforts that are expended in a freeriding environment. Similarly, outside
shareholders must struggle both with managerial misbehavior and with
the problem of allocating monitoring tasks among potentially freeriding
shareholders. By thus recognizing the freeriding problem, one can predict
that the firm will need to pay higher premiums for outside financing than
predicted by the Jensen-Meckling model; however, a more complete un-
derstanding of the firm requires an inquiry into the ways in which it can
respond to and solve the freeriding problem among monitors.
a. The Use of Secured Creditors
The analysis set out earlier in this Article described a solution to the
freeriding problem among creditor-monitors in which talented monitors
were given unique monitoring assignments as secured creditors.91 The
89. Such marches traditionally proceed according to a conservative drummer. "High" debt-equity
ratios are generally regarded as unsafe past a certain point. See Baxter, supra note 76, at 395 ("[I]n
the real world it is impossible to obtain debt financing unless creditors believe there is a sufficient
equity cushion.").
90. The discussion in the text holds constant other influences on the tendency of managers to
misbehave. These factors, including risk aversion and moral sensibilities, are not, however, likely to
yield radically different results as the debt-equity ratio rises.
91. See supra p. 56.
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success of this solution was limited by the extent to which the security
interests that could be offered by a given debtor were useful focal points
for the monitoring of that debtor.92 If, for example, the monitors of collat-
eralized assets could be expected to discover all instances of conversion and
risk alteration by the debtor, then the freeriding problem among creditors
could be entirely solved; the secured monitor assigned to each asset would
have no peers and, therefore, no temptation to freeride. Unfortunately, the
freeriding problem among shareholders cannot be solved analogously.
There is no way to assign specific assets to shareholders, both because
shareholders' claims are residual9 and because the firm's profits cannot be
traced back to particular assets.94
The freeriding problem among shareholders, however, can be alleviated
if the information obtained by the secured creditors-whose unique as-
signments are not subject to freeriding-is useful to the shareholders. If
shareholders benefit from such information, they will employ secured
creditors to perform monitoring activities.
Secured creditors that monitor their collateralized assets can provide
"signals" about the financial stability of the firm to its outside sharehold-
ers. Under Article 9, a secured creditor is entitled to exercise its rights in
the collateral following a default or breach of any of the terms of its secur-
ity agreement with the debtor to make a payment when due. The public
exercise of these rights transmits, at the very least, a strong signal of de-
fault itself.95 Shareholders (or directors) beset by monitoring difficulties
92. Some of the debtor's assets might not be useful as collateral for secured transactions. See supra
p. 59. Additionally, for administrative or other reasons, Article 9 and other legal norms may not
provide for the use of such assets as security interests. The extent to which the basic monitoring-
freeriding argument can be adapted to explain the entire list of transactions excluded from Article 9,
see U.C.C. § 9-104 (1977), lies beyond the scope of this Article.
93. The secured creditor's motivation to monitor derives primarily from the knowledge that in the
event of a breach the collateral will be available to satisfy its claim before others. But what could a
shareholder-monitor be offered with respect to an assigned asset? The creditor has a fixed claim and
can at any point be fully satisfied; the shareholder has an unlimited interest in upside return and
therefore can never be fully satisfied with collateral.
94. If the firm's profits were clearly traceable to specific assets, shareholders might divide up the
assets and behave as if they were separate firms combining in a productive endeavor. Each share-
holder would then bear the losses and profits associated with the assigned assets. Even beyond the
obvious impracticality of this division, the failure of physical assets to explain all of the firm's earnings
(such as those derived from goodwill) indicates the unreality of this approach.
95. The discussion refers to two distinct types of signals. First, the signals or warnings relayed to
shareholders by secured creditors are straightforward; the shareholders seek certain information and
are able to extract it from signals provided by monitors. Second, there are passive signals or "screens"
transmitted in various settings. See A.M. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN
HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974). When detailed information is expensive to ob-
tain-as on an assembly line or in a pool of applicants-it may be practical to assume that the
average quality of a group is descriptive of any particular individual found in that group. Of course,
individuals then have incentives to join certain groups, such as diploma-bearers, in order to transmit
profitable signals. See id. at 14-37, 76-87. In the corporate context, managers may be judged by their
association with a bankrupt firm, although bankruptcies are not always traceable to inferior
management.
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will, for example, find it relatively easy to note instances of judicial fore-
closure, 6 repossession 97 or disposition of collateral.9" In the case of some
liquid collateral, collection by the secured creditor of payments from the
debtor's obligors will provide a similarly clear signal.99
The real usefulness to shareholders of these signals derives from the
information they provide about managerial performance and misbehavior.
Clearly, shareholders need to know whether their corporation's managers
are well-suited for the positions they fill. In particular, it is especially
difficult to review managerial activity in a complex organization when the
worry is not so much about affirmative misdeeds as about whether differ-
ent personnel could better serve the firm. Such information is difficult to
obtain; only a limited amount can be learned from comparisons with com-
peting firms 00 and from explicit reports about those in control. Thus, it
seems quite plausible that shareholders seek "reporting stations," in the
form of terms in security agreements, that assist them in acquiring infor-
mation about the firm's financial health. For example, they might want to
know about the firm's inability to meet loan repayment schedules that
appeared reasonable when introduced.
Under this view, a firm reduces its agency costs by establishing a warn-
ing system that consists of outside monitors who receive and note fixed
payments or other requirements. When such an undertaking fails to mate-
rialize, a monitor is encouraged, through exercising default provisions, to
relay the information. Shareholders, in turn, receive these warning signals
and can investigate the performances of the firm's managers or seek to
experiment with different personnel arrangements.101
96. See U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1977). The secured party may exercise its claim to judgment and
foreclosure or otherwise enforce the security interest by "any available judicial procedure." Sharehold-
ers might follow such court proceedings or note advertisements for judicial sales.
97. See id. § 9-503. The secured party may repossess its secured collateral unless it agrees to other
arrangements. Shareholders might do a small amount of monitoring and notice a missing fixture, or
note repossession proceedings in the media.
98. See id. § 9-504. In seeking to dispose of such collateral, the secured party might advertise such
a sale and thereby bring the situation to the attention of shareholders.
99. See id. § 9-502. Shareholders who engage in a small amount of monitoring may note that
some previously expected receivables are no longer arriving.
100. So many variables come into play in comparing two enterprises that the relative success of
one firm can rarely be credited solely to a single manager. Firms are likely to make many decisions on
the basis of limited exploratory steps that allow comparisons only among different states of the firm
itself. For an interesting effort to model this process, see Nelson, Winter & Schuette, Technical
Change in an Evolutionary Model, 90 Q.J. ECON. 90 (1976) (describing growth model linked to
success of "exploratory" activities).
101. In some sense, the text begs the question of how such changes or experiments are under-
taken. If dispersed shareholders are truly paralyzed by freeriding, then all such changes must be
promised ex ante in the managers' employment contracts or in credit arrangements. In reality, some of
these "change mechanisms" are probably built into the managerial socialization process. Managers
who are unable to meet expectations are, perhaps, shamed into exploring alternative career paths.
These mechanisms are beyond the scope of the present description.
Often, however, shareholders may be selfish and hesitant rather than paralyzed. When signals are
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The value to the firm of these signals, and therefore of debt, is en-
hanced by their role in the discovery of managerial misbehavior. A man-
ager's reputation and employment potential would probably suffer sub-
stantial damage because of his association with or direction of a firm that
defaults on its obligations or becomes bankrupt. Because future employers
find accurate information about the manager's ability even more expensive
to obtain than do present employers,1"2 they may take the signal of de-
fault""3 even more seriously than do the immediately affected sharehold-
ers."04 Thus, once a default occurs, lateral employment opportunities are
limited and the manager may be more tempted than ever to misbehave. A
less dramatic but still important form of misbehavior that can also be fore-
seen by a signal of default derives from the manager's interest in keeping
the firm afloat when the shareholders' interest calls for its dissolution. The
more a manager's job skills and experience (human capital) are firm-spe-
cific, 10 5 the less he will be able to replicate his compensation package else-
where and the greater his incentive will be to forestall a shutdown or
contraction of the firm.106 At the very least, the firm's continuing opera-
tion will be of interest to its managers while they search for new
employment.
In summary, a firm can lower its capital costs by reducing the freerid-
ing problem among shareholders if it employs secured creditors, with im-
plicit and unique monitoring assignments, to signal information to other
investors. The effectiveness of this signalling system depends on the ease
with which information can be transmitted and on the discreteness of the
monitoring assignments.10
7
It is worthwhile to examine the place of unsecured creditors in this
model. Some creditors are unsecured even when there are unassigned focal
points simply because it would be too cumbersome for firms to deal with
all suppliers by prepayment,108 security assignment, 0 9 or promises in the
received these shareholders will be more confident that their investigation and litigation will now be
rewarded. Similarly, the board of directors may be more effective in responding to warning signals
than in carrying out clueless monitoring exercises.
102. See supra note 50.
103. Litigation concerning the performance of the manager or of his previous firm may be another
such signal.
104. The less information an actor possesses the more crude the signals on which he must rely.
Present employers may take the signal of default as a stimulant to examine the manager's abilities
further. Other employers, however, may not be in a position to obtain additional information and may
need to accept the only available signal (default) indicative of the manager's ability.
105. The manager's worth may reflect his knowledge about the industry as a whole and about the
resources and bureaucracy of the specific firm for which he works. Only the former is useful to
another firm.
106. For an example of such forestalling, see In re Carter & Johnson, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 17,597 (Feb. 28, 1981).
107. Some firms may not have useful focal points to assign. See supra p. 59.
108. Prepayment is not always possible because the quality and value of supplies are not always
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form of equity shares."' The remaining bulk of unsecured credit might be
regarded as critical "filler material" that provides incentives for the se-
cured monitors. Indeed, if there were little unsecured credit in a firm's
financial structure, and the aggregate value of the the collateralized assets
fell short of the total value of the firm, the secured creditors would enjoy
so substantial a cushion beneath their exclusive claims as to dilute seri-
ously their incentive to monitor.' It is, of course, counterproductive and
impractical to demote undercollateralized secured creditors in bankruptcy
to the status of equity owners."'
b. The Bondholders' Trustee
Another institution that may be useful to outside shareholders and that
is responsive to the freeriding problem is the bondholders' trustee. The
Trust Indenture Act"' was designed, in part, to overcome the freeriding
problem."" It requires that the trustee have adequate powers to protect
the bondholders." 5 The role played by a bondholders' trustee may be
analogized to that of an outside director." 6 Whether the typical trustee's
fees and resources are comparatively greater than those at the disposal of
outside directors is an empirical question that cannot be easily an-
swered." 7 The reliability of the trustee as monitor, however, is enhanced
known beforehand. Moreover, prepayment may involve a large number of transactions and, therefore,
high transaction costs. See also supra pp. 55-56 (discussing impracticality of limiting debtor to single
creditor).
109. A secured transaction often will be unsatisfactory to a supplier because the service or good
delivered may be unusable as a security interest and other assets of the requisite value may be un-
available for this purpose. Moreover, the supplier may simply be uninterested in a monitoring assign-
ment and unwilling to pay a premium for it.
110. Denominating suppliers' claims in equity form requires a clear exchange rate between the
two. If shares are not actively traded, each transaction will entail substantial costs. Furthermore, in
many settings the preexisting shareholders will have worked out voting arrangements, possibly pro-
tected by preemptive rights, that would be upset by new shareholders.
111. Potential shareholders would then be without effective monitors and accordingly would re-
quire greater expected returns to invest in the enterprise.
112. Such demotion would decrease the secured monitor's incentive in the event of depreciation of
its collateral. See supra p. 57. In particular, if the now senior unsecured creditors were likely to
exhaust all of the debtor's assets, there would be no incentive at all for the secured creditor to monitor.
Moreover, the demoted secured creditors will discover that the equity owners are benefitted by risk
alteration and are, therefore, incompatible peers.
113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976). The Act sets out requirements for bonds, debentures,
notes, and other debt securities offered to the public by mail or in interstate commerce but exempts
issues of not more than $250,000 within twelve consecutive months and those of not more than
$1,000,000 within thirty-six consecutive months. The Act further requires a qualifying indenture and
trustee.
114. See SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES
part VI, at 2-6 (1936).
115. See SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 153-55 (1944) (discussing cen-
tral role of trustee in protecting bondholders).
116. See supra pp. 61-63.
117. To fill the monitoring role described in this Article, the trustee needs resources sufficient only
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by its high reputational interest. The corporations that serve as trustees
are long-lived and stand to lose a great deal of future business if their
reputations are tarnished by negligent or overreaching behavior. More-
over, the law assists bondholders in pursuing claims against a misbehaving
trustee by denying the trustee the "business judgment rule" defense that is
enjoyed by shareholders' representatives."" Thus, despite comparable fact
situations and potential conflicts of interest, bondholders appear to do con-
siderably better than shareholders in recovering from their representa-
tives.119 In addition, trustee misbehavior is often easily discovered without
intense monitoring efforts. Thus, in one well-known case,1"' a bank-trus-
tee violated its duties by separately negotiating with the debtor for a loan
that allowed the bank to obtain a priority over the bondholders whom it
had represented as trustee. The prevailing legal standard obviated any
substantial monitoring effort by the scattered bondholders. The bank was
forced to resign as trustee before negotiating its own loan; bondholders
received notice of this resignation and launched an investigation. 21
In some settings the bondholders' trustee might even be regarded as a
supermonitor, capable of solving freeriding problems among secured credi-
tors themselves. Consider a debtor that owns a substantial number of rail-
road cars. The assignment of a railroad car as a security interest may
solve a freeriding problem among numerous lenders and other investors. If
individual cars are assigned to a number of secured creditors, however, a
freeriding problem will develop among those creditors because their secur-
ity interests will be closely linked. 22 Unless they deal with a creditors'
representative, or trustee, the shareholders of this debtor will be unable to
enjoy the benefits of an efficient warning system because monitoring tasks
cannot be uniquely assigned.12 3 In short, the bondholders' trustee appears
to be one more example of a legal institution that reflects monitoring and
freeriding considerations.
12 4
to note defaults by the debtor. Directors, on the other hand, may know neither what they are looking
for nor where to look.
118. For the evolution of the trustee's standard of conduct, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN,
CORPORATE FINANCE 82-99 (2d ed. 1979).
119. Compare Morris v. Cantor, 390 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (bondholder's claim under
Trust Indenture Act upheld against bank's motion for summary judgment where bank, employed as
trustee for bondholders, negotiated a loan with bondholder's debtor) with Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309
Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941) (no duty violated where corporate directors acquired substantial
ownership share of competitor).
120. Morris v. Cantor, 390 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
121. During that period, the debtor also defaulted on a payment to the bondholders. Id. at 818.
122. The secured creditors will themselves have a freeriding problem as they over- or under-rely
on each other's monitoring.
123. See supra p. 59.
124. When a firm uses a trustee as supermonitor, the proportion of the firm's debt that is secured
is likely to be relatively high. This arrangement, however, does not affect the firm's debt-equity ratio.
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c. Preferred Shareholders
The role of preferred stock in the corporate structure has remained a
curious mystery in the corporate finance literature. Preferred stock offers
neither the corporate issuer nor the shareholders the tax advantages asso-
ciated with debt.125 Its issuance can hardly allay creditors' concerns of
potential misbehavior, because preferred stock, like additional debt, would
seem to increase the temptation of risk alteration to the firm's manag-
ers.126 The dividend preferences of preferred stock, however, can be un-
derstood as part of the "warning system" described in this Article. The
firm's inability to meet preferred shareholders' claims in a timely way will
send a powerful signal to the dispersed owners of the firm.1 27 Moreover,
this signal may eventually lead to a displacement of the managers who
have been unable to meet the firm's expectations: the holders of preferred
stock, voting as a class, may have the right to elect at least a majority of
the corporation's directors after a specified number of dividend payments
have been missed.
1 2 8
Thus, although preferred stock does not encourage any active monitor-
ing of the firm, it serves as a passive signalling device. Secured creditors
(and the bondholders' trustee) are active monitors on the lookout for con-
version, risk alteration, and missed payments; their signals are quite em-
phatic but are likely to involve transaction costs on the part of the debtor.
These costs include the expense of monitoring the monitor in order to
ensure that any surplus in the value of the collateral over the secured
creditor's entitlement redounds to the debtor's benefit,1 29 and of modifying
the debtor's operation when an important asset is repossessed.130 In con-
trast, preferred stock entails none of these costs. The firm might therefore
125. Corporate issuers can deduct interest but not dividend payments. Shareholders normally re-
gard receipts with respect to preferred stock as ordinary income while bondholders may be able to
treat receipts as return of capital. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.08 (1980).
126. Assuming that the manager is not also a creditor, he will be tempted to engage in risk
alteration at the expense of fixed claimants, see supra p. 52. If preferred shareholders are not entitled
to interest-bearing cumulative arrearages, then they too must be seriously concerned about risk
alteration.
127. The firm will be unable to pay common stock dividends and will find it difficult to raise
more capital until the cumulative claims of preferred shareholders are met. See V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 118, at 174-78, 182-86.
128. See Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975) (concerning char-
ter that provided for preferred shareholders to elect majority of directors any time six or more quar-
terly dividends were not paid, whether or not such quarters were consecutive).
129. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1977) (providing incentives for debtor to "monitor the monitor" by
entitling debtor to claim surplus).
130. If the firm's operations will be seriously disturbed by the repossession of the collateral, the
firm can be expected to choose to redeem the collateral by satisfying the claim of the secured party.
See id. § 9-506. To accomplish this redemption, however, the firm may need to sell other assets and
therefore have to modify its operations.
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be understood as attempting to reduce its capital costs by choosing a desir-
able mix of active, relatively expensive monitors (secured creditors) and
passive, relatively inexpensive monitors (preferred shareholders).13 The
passive monitoring role of preferred shareholders, furthermore, is consis-
tent with the absence of a "preferred shareholders' trustee"; the freeriding
problem among preferred shareholders is not important because they are
not expected to expend resources on active monitoring.
The monitoring role of preferred stock, however, can be duplicated by
carefully drawn provisions in a credit contract. The "income bond" is one
example of such a contract; it provides that interest is payable only to the
extent covered by corporate earnings.13 2 Through their trustee, income
bondholders may be able to provide some active monitoring.13 3 Unlike
preferred stock, however, income bonds do not offer a tool to displace in-
cumbent managers.""
Corporate financial structures seem to have evolved as a result of the
emergence of alternatives to preferred stock. Indeed, new issues of pre-
ferred stock have become quite rare.13 5 The practice of public utilities
constitutes a notable exception to this trend, but their use of preferred




131. The less the preferred stock contract paralyzes a firm that misses dividend payments, the less
the preferred stock dividends are like fixed claims.
132. For a description of a number of such "hybrid" securities, see W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
supra note 46, at 1112-13.
133. The cost of the trustee's services must ultimately be borne by the firm. Thus, if there are no
good focal points for monitoring but the passive signals of preferred shareholders are useful, the firm
might rationally opt for preferred stock rather than income bonds.
134. The "displacement" power of preferred shares may be obtained by the convertibility feature
of many bonds. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 46, at 1144-47. Bondholders may convert
in large enough numbers to affect the firm's decisionmaking. This relationship between monitoring
and convertibility may shed light on the curious, if traditional, distaste for "upstream" convertibility.
See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 15(e) (1979). Potential monitors who could convert to more senior
securities would be especially disinclined to contribute monitoring effort of their own. Certainly, the
issue of "downsteam" convertible securities-which have been regarded as inapt combinations of ap-
ples and oranges (risk and certainty)-might be understood either as enabling monitors to follow up
on their discoveries or as offering monitors a financial incentive to help the firm realize its upside
potential even when its fixed obligations are easily met. See Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar
Package, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 548-60 (1975) (explaining the mixed fruit metaphor and offering
admittedly unsatisfactory explanations for the combination).
135. J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 631 (5th ed. 1980).
136. I.R.C. §§ 243, 244 (West 1982) allow corporate shareholders to exclude from their taxable
income most or all of the dividends received from their investments. No such treatment is granted for
interest receipts. Insurance companies and other corporations that traditionally invest in utilities thus
prefer preferred stock to debt. The utilities prefer to retain some earnings of common stock to attract
high tax bracket individual shareholders as well as corporate investors. See Fisher & Wilt, Non-
Convertible Preferred Stock as a Financing Instrument 1950-1965, 23 J. FIN. 611 (1968).
137. Ratemaking commissions normally allow utilities a "fair" rate of return on assets. Utilities
thus may seek to borrow funds so long as the rate allowed is greater than the cost of new debt. If the
utility needs to be self-conscious about "overcapitalization" it may eschew debt but favor preferred
stock so that its original owners can profit from the spread between the allowed rate of return and the
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III. Some Normative Implications
The responsiveness of the firm's financial structure, as described in Part
II, is but one example of the many ways in which institutions and rules
can be understood as adapting to monitors and freeriders 3 s This Part
considers the extent to which legal rules should incorporate enforcement
considerations.
A. Monitoring, Corporate Control Premiums, and Fair Shares
Recall that the monitoring requirements of outside equity are greater
the smaller the ownership share of the firm's controlling manager.1 3' It
follows that outside shareholders benefit when a single, large shareholder
dominates the firm. 4 ° If this "controlleur" manages the firm's operations,
then his tendency to misbehave is relatively low because he retains a large
percentage of the firm's earnings. Outside shareholders are probably even
better situated in an ownership structure that includes one relatively large
shareholder as manager and another in outside equity (intent on monitor-
ing). Self-interest will then keep agency costs to a minimum.
1 41
The obligations of a controlleur and, in particular, the "sale of corpo-
rate control," have been discussed extensively in the legal literature,14 but
cost of new capital. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 483 (2d ed. 1980) (reviewing principle of fair return and possible effects on utilities' capital
structures).
138. The responsiveness of legal rules to monitoring considerations is clear. Consider, for exam-
ple, the different duties of care assigned to trustees of orphans' assets, corporate officers, and
merchants. Orphans are often too young to engage in monitoring; their trustees are accordingly held to
the highest standard. See 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (3d ed. 1967). Corporate insiders
are monitored by somewhat more sophisticated investors (and by those hired to staff the firm's focal
points) and are allowed the "business judgment" defense. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERO, supra note
46, at 518-53. Finally, merchants, who may be "monitored" by customers, competitors, and suppliers,
do not seem to be required to meet any fiduciary standard. See Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 506-08, 543-46 (1967) (discussing
unconscionability under U.C.C. § 2-302 in context of merchant-merchant dealings).
139. The more an agent's efforts benefit his principals and not himself, the more the principals
might fear misbehavior given the divergence of interests between the principal and the agent. See
supra p. 66; infra note 148.
140. This assumes stable behavior on the part of the controlling shareholder. A change in the
distribution pattern of the firm's profits unilaterally made by the new controlling shareholder may
result in temporary or periodic difficulties for the minority shareholders. For an illustrative case that
may have arisen out of such a troubled relationship, see Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 40 Del. Ch.
509, 185 A.2d 480 (1962) (controlling shareholder potentially able to receive dividends in separate
corporation and avoid or defer ordinary income tax cannot be compelled to make distribution of divi-
dend to minority shareholders). With respect to monitoring considerations, the existence of a control-
ling shareholder will be beneficial to the extent that the interest of the minority is in line with that of
the controlling shareholder.
141. The manager-shareholder will be relatively well-behaved. The monitor will have a strong
interest in expending effort and, it might be supposed, will be unlikely to risk freeriding on the
expected monitoring of smaller outside shareholders.
142. See, e.g., Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965); O'Neal, Sale of Control, 4 J. CORP. L. 239 (1979).
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little attention has been paid to related monitoring implications. Consider
the case in which a controlling interest in a target company is sold by the.
outgoing controlleur to an acquirer for a price that reflects a significant
premium above the recent market price for the target company's shares.
Assume that this premium is greater than that normally obtainable from a
buyer who suddenly demands many inframarginal holdings of potential
sellers.1"' Assuming further the law's (and any available monitor's) ability
to prevent the worst abuses, such as a plan by the acquirer with collusive
assistance from the controlleur to "loot" the target, 144 the acquirer may be
presumed to have a "better idea" for the management of the target so that
the value of that company under the guidance of the new management
may be expected to rise.
145
Under this view, the target's small shareholders ought to be pleased
over the sale of control. The greater the premium paid by the acquirer,
the more confident they can be that they will freeride on the "coattails" of
his better idea and benefit from his stewardship. 141 Salary and perquisites
aside, the acquirer must rationally expect the target's shares to be worth
even more than what he has paid for them. Small shareholders may actu-
ally be better off than the controlleur, who will enjoy no coattail effect.
Certainly, some small shareholders might have preferred the immediate
cash that the former controlleur enjoys, but it is appealing to argue that
by his sale he has done his former minority shareholders no harm. 47 Ar-
143. A quantum leap in the demand for any product that is not the subject of very elastic demand
will generally result in a discontinuous increase in the price for that product, reflecting the marginal
price at which the last seller would be willing to exchange the item.
144. Regulation of the sale of corporate control will have a deterrent effect on "looters." See
Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U.
CHI. L. REV. 420, 421-23 (1965). The discussion in the text, however, focuses on monitoring consid-
erations and not on the deterrence of looting.
145. See Hazen, The Sale of Corporate Control: Towards a Three-Tier Approach, 4 J. CORP. L.
263 (1979); Javaras, supra note 144, at 427. It is perhaps fair to wonder, under this view, why so
many acquirers pay substantial premiums to gain control of targets. There are three lines of response.
First, the acquirer may be impatient to put his idea into effect and may fear that someone else will
develop a competing, or even identical, idea. Second, although this acquirer's better idea for operating
the target corporation may be an enormous improvement over the target's prior performance, other
current buyers may have ideas for improvement as well. In order to outbid these competitors, the
"best" acquirer must pay a substantial premium that, essentially, yields the selling shareholders some
economic rent. This argument assumes that the competing ideas are firm-specific; that is, that they
relate to the particular target corporation. Finally, even if the acquirer with the better idea has no
competitor, the selling shareholders may realize that the better idea is firm-specific and that they offer
as unique a good (the target) as does the acquirer (the idea). The theory of bilateral monopoly then
explains that the resulting premium over the previous market price is hardly a surprise. For an
excellent explanation of bilateral monopoly, see W. VICKREY, MICROSTATICS 115-16 (1964).
146. Part or all of the ride on the coattails may, of course, be put to an end by a "freezeout" in
which remaining shareholders are forced to accept cash for their equity. See Brudney & Chirelstein,
A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); Levmore, Self-Assessed Valua-
tion Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 847-58 (1982).
147. A freezeout can make some shareholders worse off, even under an equal payments compen-
sation scheme, depending, for example, on their personal tax circumstances. See Toms, Compensating
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guably, the surviving small shareholders are better off the more shares the
acquirer has purchased, so long as they retain their shares. After all, the
larger the acquirer's share of the target is, the less his incentive to misbe-
have will be.' 48
Consider, however, the classic situation presented in Perlman v. Feld-
mann."'49 Feldmann, the controlleur of Newport Steel Corporation, sold
his interest to Wilport Company, a joint venture of several independent
steel users, at a premium over the market price. A derivative suit was
brought by some small shareholders against the sale. The subsequent suc-
cess of that suit in the Second Circuit has been the focus of so many
theories and commentaries that it is hardly necessary to detail the ambigu-
ity of the decision's principle.' 50 It does seem worthwhile, however, to
examine the case from a monitoring cost perspective. The monitoring task
of outside equity is likely to be more formidable when a parent corpora-
tion (such as Wilport) controls the firm than when an individual control-
leur is at the helm because the former is itself a complex contractual con-
struction with its own monitoring and freeriding problems. Following
Feldmann's departure, a small shareholder of Newport would need to be
anxious not only about the misbehavior that arises from the less-than-total
ownership interest of the controlleur but also from the divergence of inter-
ests within the controlling block. Put numerically, assume an individual
controlleur's influence results from his ownership of forty percent of the
target's stock1 51 and that this interest is sold to an acquirer that is, in turn,
controlled by a manager who owns fifty percent of the acquirer's stock.
The outgoing controlleur's incentive to misbehave can be traced to the
sixty percent "divergence" between his own and the target's fortunes.' 52
The new manager, however, has a stronger incentive to misbehave be-
cause he has but a twenty percent interest in the target. The divergence of
interests between the controlleur and the target's minority shareholders is
now greater: eighty as compared to sixty percent. A small shareholder of
the target might well be disadvantaged by this greater incentive to misbe-
have, and by the consequently greater need for monitoring.
153
Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 569-70 (1978).
148. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313-16. But cf supra p. 68 (doubting that every small
change in ownership share affects managerial behavior).
149. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
150. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 46, at 699-700, 707-10 (citing events, theories,
and refusals to abide by precedent that followed Perlman).
151. Through family and corporate relationships, Feldmann actually controlled and sold 33% of
Newport's outstanding stock. The sale included another 4% held by his friends and associates. See 219
F.2d at 174 n.l.
152. Reputational interests and other factors, see supra pp. 60-63, are ignored for the purposes of
the analysis here. The text focuses only on misbehavior that is related to the divergence of interests
between shareholders and their agent.
153. Arguably, investors could be aware of this risk before purchasing shares. If that were the
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Moreover, the quality as well as quantity of monitoring problems must
be considered. Assuming that a parent corporation's duty to the noncon-
trolling shareholders of its subsidiary requires some "fair sharing"-that
is, the parent may not selfishly dictate the terms of joint ventures and
intercorporate transactions but must assign the rewards as they might
have been after arm's length negotiations' 54-it is quite likely that moni-
toring is a more consuming task when the controlleur is a related corpora-
tion than when it is an individual such as Feldmann. The parent corpora-
tion might take more than its fair share by way. of contractual
arrangements for the subsidiary's assets, charges for fixed costs such as
executives' salaries, tax avoidance strategies, 5 ' and imputed prices for
goods and services exchanged between the two entities.15' Thus, in addi-
tion to the quantitative monitoring differential that is typically generated
by the sale of a controlling interest by an individual to a corporation, it
seems fair to conclude that monitoring needs should be expected to in-
crease because of the difficulties encountered in policing intercorporate
transactions.157 These monitoring considerations should be taken into ac-
count in fashioning legal rules governing relationships among
shareholders.'
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case, the stock's market price would reflect the expected value of the changing monitoring costs. This
perspective, however, misses the social cost of agency relationships. Even if investors expect greater
monitoring costs, the avoidance of these costs is beneficial (and ultimately reduces the cost of doing
business).
154. For the classic statement on "fair shares," see Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corpo-
rate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974). The argument is not, however, limited to
organic changes but is applicable to all transactions between the corporate fiduciary and beneficiary.
Nonmerger cases containing the issue of fair sharing include Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 136 F.2d 876
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 787 (1943); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971);
Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970). The fair-shares problem also arises in
allocating tax savings between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. Compare Alliegro v. Pan Am.
Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (parent corporation could not transfer gains of
subsidiary for tax purposes where minority shareholders of the subsidiary had not approved of such
procedure), cert. denied, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963) with Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d
150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965) (parent corporation could transfer such gains for tax
purposes inasmuch as minority shareholders of subsidiary had vital interest in parent corporation's
continuing financial and operating viability).
The Brudney-Chirelstein view has been attacked from a number of directions. See, e.g., Lorne, A
Reappraisal of Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1978); Toms, supra note
147. Virtually all commentators agree, however, that some monitoring on the part of minority share-
holders is necessary.
155. Interestingly, the Internal Revenue Code does occasionally attempt to put minority share-
holders of a subsidiary corporation in the same position as the controlling parent corporation. See
I.R.C. § 337(d) (West 1982).
156. This aspect is difficult to monitor. The Internal Revenue Service will "assist" minority
shareholders with their monitoring only when a tax liability is at stake-as when profits appear to be
directed to the corporate entity with loss carryovers or with no domestic nexus. But these are unlikely
to be situations in which the minority is being wronged.
157. On the other hand, if the sale is by a corporation to an individual, minority shareholders are
likely to encounter decreased monitoring difficulties.
158. In other areas, legal rules could also be responsive to monitoring concerns. For example, the
appropriate legal standard for judging the conduct of a trustee of a nonprofit institution might be
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No quick conclusion concerning the legitimacy of Perlman's claim or
the proper treatment of control premiums is possible. An extreme position
is surely untenable; if, for example, sales of control that increased moni-
toring requirements were blocked unless premiums were shared, then the
pooling of capital would be stymied and worthwhile projects would go
untackled.' 59 On the other hand, the "coattail" effect is easily overstated if
the increased monitoring costs borne by the surviving outside equity own-
ers are ignored. What is clear is that any analysis that ignores these sug-
gested links is bound to be unsatisfactory.
B. Monitoring and Standing
Legal rules that assign "standing to sue" to some but not all interested
parties can also be understood better by taking monitoring and freeriding
considerations into account. Because an effective monitor must be able to
trigger corrective action, it is no surprise that the freeriding problems as-
sociated with monitors and litigators are closely related. Consider, for ex-
ample, the suggestion that creditors be able to sue derivatively on behalf of
solvent corporations.1 60 Traditionally, a creditor is unable to bring legal
action against its solvent debtor unless the debtor has acted with actual
intent to defraud creditors. 6 " Although a court-appointed receiver or trus-
based upon the difficulty of monitoring that trustee. The few litigated cases that confront the question
of proper legal standards offer conflicting precedents: Some apply a corporate standard (allowing a
business judgment defense), others resort to stricter, classic trust principles, and others avoid the ques-
tion. Compare George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 271 P.2d 600 (1954)
(denying liability of president and former directors of charitable corporation for actions taken in good
faith) with Marsh, Governance of Non-Profit Organizations: An Appropriate Standard of Conduct
for Trustees and Directors of Museums and Other Cultural Institutions, 85 DICK. L. REV. 607, 619-
20 (1981) (citing cases in which courts will not protect business judgment of nonprofits' trustees) and
Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp.
1003, 1013, 1019 (D.D.C. 1974) (suggesting that any possibility of conflicts of interest must be
avoided and that stricter standards of care may apply to trustees of nonprofit charitable hospital than
to corporate directors). It has been suggested, see Marsh, supra, at 622-27, that a museum's trustee
should be held to the standard of the corporate manager because the trustee's decisions are similar to
those of corporate managers. This approach overlooks monitoring considerations. A better argument
for relaxing the classical trustee standard in judging a nonprofit institution's trustee would rely on the
monitoring of the institution's activities that is carried on-at no direct cost to the beneficiaries-by
local media, peer institutions, internal whistle-blowers, professional associations, and even the Internal
Revenue Service. In fact, the most visible nonprofit institutions, such as large universities and art
museums, are so intensely monitored from within and without that a standard even more relaxed than
that applied to corporate managers may actually be appropriate. It is interesting to note that the court
in Stern observed that the defendant hospital was "not closely regulated by any public authority, ...
has no responsibility to file financial reports, and its Board is self-perpetuating." 381 F. Supp. at
1019.
159. For a discussion of efficiency costs resulting from a premium sharing rule, see Easterbrook &
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705-14 (1982).
160. See Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corporations, 88 YALE L.J. 1299
(1979).
161. See McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L.
REV. 249, 253-57 (1981); see also Note, supra note 160, at 1300 & n.1 I (discussing limitation upon
creditor's rights where debtor is solvent).
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tee can generally enforce a corporation's claim against its misbehaving
manager, only creditors of an insolvent firm will succeed in urging such
an appointment. 62 The suggestion that creditors be able to sue the misbe-
having managers of nondefaulting firms seems a reasonable one given that
both return and risk are essential components of the credit contract." 3 If a
creditor's actual return is for some reason less than expected, as when the
debtor sends an incomplete interest payment, the creditor is entitled to
litigate and correct the wrong he has suffered. Similarly, when the
debtor's manager misbehaves in a way that directly damages the share-
holder's equity, the creditors of the firm have reason to be disappointed,
for the smaller equity cushion makes the debtor somewhat less likely to
repay its loans. Thus, the argument runs, the creditors of even solvent
corporations ought to have standing to object to managerial misbehavior
because they suffer an expectational loss in the form of increased risk that
is as valuable as a certain amount of decreased return.
If transaction costs were low, creditors might be expected to bargain for
explicit contractual provisions concerning managerial misbehavior, such
that discovered breaches of these covenants would constitute actionable de-
fault. Moreover, the debtor might be expected to encourage and enable
such "homemade standing" because the creditor's suits will surely be a
useful part of the firm's monitoring-warning system.'" The absence of
explicit contractual provisions that, in effect, grant such standing to credi-
tors might be explained by the costs of drafting such provisions.165 On one
level, then, it would seem that the law should assist the parties and permit
"creditor standing."
Creditor standing would benefit small shareholders facing serious freer-
iding problems. In a firm with no large shareholder in a managerial or
monitoring position, and in which specific firm assets are convenient focal
points for observing managerial misbehavior, the monitoring role of se-
cured creditors is especially useful."6 Liberalizing creditor-standing rules
would clearly benefit such firms by easing the task of their most able
monitors. But liberalized creditor-standing rules may disadvantage other
firms. Recall that small, outside shareholders are particularly comfortable
162. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (1975); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1201, 1202(a)(2)
(McKinney 1963).
163. See W. KLEIN, supra note 8, at 155; Note, supra note 160, at 1305-06.
164. See supra pp. 70-71.
165. In the absence of transaction costs (and sensitive voting arrangements among investors), a
creditor might purchase some of the debtor's stock and watch for misbehavior that hurts both creditors
and shareholders, and then litigate as a shareholder (although motivated as a creditor).
166. Stated in a way that reflects the underlying causal elements, managers will find that to raise
capital for new projects they must pay a relatively high price for outside equity but a relatively low
price for some combination of outside debt (some of it secured) and outside equity.
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in firms that have a major outside shareholder,167 because such a share-
holder will normally be a highly motivated monitor.'18 The grant of
standing to creditors would not appeal to the small shareholder in this
context. The combined monitoring interest and litigating power of the
firm's creditors might reduce the large shareholder's monitoring incentive
and lead him to freeride on. the creditor's efforts. Thus, firms with
financial structures presently supporting efficient monitoring would prob-
ably be worse off with liberal creditor-standing rules, for such rules could
introduce freeriding difficulties.
Ideally, perhaps, creditor-standing rules might be available in some
settings and not others. It is, however, difficult to distinguish prospectively
among desirable and undesirable settings."69 The prevailing limitation on
creditor standing might therefore be understood as preventing freeriding
problems in some circumstances and relying on the potential for explicit
covenants granting standing in others. Any rational reexamination of
creditor standing, however, ought to weigh the benefits and freeriding
costs of a more liberal rule.1
70
Conclusion
The nature of human behavior and of interactive enterprises compels
the consideration of monitoring efforts in describing and assessing legal
institutions and relationships. Although the importance of monitoring
167. See supra p. 76.
168. Note that such a firm is likely to have relatively little secured debt because there is little role
for creditors as monitoring agents.
169. For example, even if the structure of outside equity (the presence of a large noncontrolling
shareholder) is accepted as a proxy for the quality of the monitoring likely to occur, creditors can
hardly be told that their power to litigate may change as shares are exchanged and the structure of
outside equity is altered.
In reality, the creditors most likely to serve as monitors, such as commercial banks, often enjoy low
transaction costs and can, therefore, either bargain for covenants that will generate legal standing
when needed or actually purchase shares of the debtor.
170. The relationship between monitoring and standing is also important in other contexts. Con-
sider, for example, the requirement in most of tort law that the plaintiff suffer actual damage rather
than just exposure to the risk. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. II!. 1978)
(allegations concerning experiment that increased risk of cancer-but caused no direct physical in-
jury-not sufficient to support cause of action for negligence); see also C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 967-72 (3d ed. 1q77) (recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional harm unlikely without actual physical injury). Thus, ten pedestrians frightened by a negli-
gent driver may have no remedy for the risks they experience, much like the creditor of a solvent but
misbehaving debtor. If one of these pedestrians is hit by the driver, the law will require the payment
of damages for the "outcome" actually generated. It could, alternatively, focus on "risk-creation" and
require a payment (into a superfund available for actual hospital bills, for example) for each "scare,"
thus providing identical (ex ante) deterrence from the negligent driving. Arguably, the risk-creation
system, with its provision of liberal standing, is flawed because of its monitoring weakness: no single
pedestrian has much incentive to report negligent driving.
Of course, other areas of law often elicit payment for risk-creation, including speeding and driving
under the influence of alcohol. But the discussion in this section does not dwell on "mixed-monitor-
ing" systems actually in place and limits itself to the design of standing rules.
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costs has been discussed in some specific contexts, it has not been recog-
nized as a pervasive feature of economic and legal arrangements. More-
over, the influence of freeriding behavior on monitoring efforts has re-
ceived little attention outside the context of corporate shareholders. This
Article has sought to undertake a broader analysis of freeriding problems
among monitors. It has described the financial structure of firms as re-
sponsive to monitoring and freeriding considerations and has argued that
legal rules ought to pay attention to such considerations. Although there
are numerous forces and components that shape business ventures, an un-
derstanding of monitors, freeriders, and the reactions they produce con-
tributes to a richer appreciation of enterprises and of the rules that govern
their behavior. Inasmuch as self-interested parties also play prominent
roles outside the business context, inquiries regarding a wide variety of
legal rules might be enriched by analyses such as those undertaken in this
Article.
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